Comparing The South African Stock Markets Response To Two Periods Of Distinct Instability The 1997-98 East Asian And Russian Crisis And The Recent Global Financial Crisis by Pretorius, Anmar & de Beer, Jesse
International Business & Economics Research Journal – May/June 2014 Volume 13, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 427 The Clute Institute 
Comparing The South African Stock 
Market’s Response To Two Periods Of 
Distinct Instability – The 1997-98 East 
Asian And Russian Crisis And The  
Recent Global Financial Crisis 
Anmar Pretorius, North-West University, South Africa 
Jesse de Beer, University of the Free State, South Africa 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper compares the South African stock market’s response to two periods of distinct 
instability, namely the East Asian and Russian crisis of 1997-98 and the global financial crisis of 
2007-09. Considering share prices, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) was more 
severely affected by the earlier crisis, when the domestic fundamentals were weaker. The low 
levels of foreign reserves were the main cause of concern. The paper further empirically 
investigates volatility spillover between the JSE and various developed and emerging stock 
markets during the two crisis periods, employing twelve separate bi-variate GARCH models. The 
main contributors to volatility spillover during the East Asian and Russian crisis were Mexico, 
Thailand, Brazil, and Germany – predominantly emerging markets. During the second crisis 
period, Germany, US, Brazil, and UK played the dominant parts – predominantly developed 
markets. The importance of Germany in both periods can be attributed to the country’s role as 
main export destination of South African goods in Europe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
iven the large costs associated with financial crises, an understanding of the elements that drive the 
propagation of crises is of vital importance. Both the East Asian and Russian crisis and the global financial 
crisis led to widespread contagion (Dungey et al., 2010) and both had a dramatic impact on South Africa. 
This is despite the fact that the South African economic fundamentals proceeding both crisis periods were very 
different from those factors that have been identified as the causes of the different crises. The rationale for focusing 
on the two crisis periods stems from the devastating impact of the crises on emerging markets, as well as very 
different global financial conditions at the onset of the two crisis periods. 
 
The Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) provides an interesting case study, since there were 
differences in the operating environment of the JSE during the two crisis periods. During the 1997-98 East Asian 
and Russian crisis, the JSE was a newcomer to the international stock market arena after years of sanctions and 
isolation, and liquidity on the JSE was low. During the recent global crisis the JSE was much more liquid and 
integrated with the world markets – partly due to institutional reforms of the JSE but also due to its established 
status as an important contributor to the FTSE advanced emerging markets index. The JSE is classified as an 
“advanced emerging market” and one of the best-regulated securities exchanges in the world (World Economic 
Forum, 2010). 
 
G 
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The aim of this paper is to compare the South African stock market’s response to these two periods of 
distinct instability. The comparison includes: the response of the JSE, as well as an estimation of the cross-country 
spillover in volatility among the JSE and several advanced and emerging stock markets during the two crisis 
periods, employing multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) models. 
 
Following Chudik and Fratzscher (2011), the paper takes a financial market perspective, analysing the 
response of equity markets as a proxy for the impact on the real economy. There are several reasons for this focus on 
the stock market. First is the availability of high frequency, recent data. Financial crises comprise a relatively short 
period, making it inherently difficult to model volatility spillovers and/or crisis transmission with macroeconomic 
data that is available only at quarterly or monthly frequency. Secondly, stock market prices are intrinsically 
forward‐looking and as such reflect expectations for future earnings, as well as the risk-adjusted rate at which these 
future earnings are discounted. Thus, stock market prices are indicative of both changes in macroeconomic 
fundamentals and investors’ risk appetite. Thirdly, stock markets were the first to feel the impact of the crises. Stock 
market prices are among the more successful early-warning indicators of crises in emerging markets. This was 
confirmed by Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) for the East Asia crisis of the late 1990s, and Rose and 
Spiegel (2009) for the global financial crisis in 2008. The rationale for studying volatility spillovers from 
international stock markets stems from the important role that foreign investors play on the JSE, especially during 
times of financial turmoil. 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on three fronts. First, it contributes to the literature on the 
propagation of financial crises, with specific emphasis on the stock market impact of the crisis on emerging markets. 
Secondly, it relates to the broad literature on the drivers of equity prices and the role of domestic and global factors 
in this regard. Thirdly, it complements and extends the results of existing empirical studies by including a broad set 
of emerging and developed stock markets and by providing an in-depth country case study of the propagation and 
consequences of two distinct periods of financial crisis. The explicit comparison between these two periods provides 
valuable insights into how changes in domestic policy variables, the international financial architecture and policies 
related specifically to the stock market can change the nature of spillovers through time. 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE: STOCK MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
This study is related to two broad strands of the literature: the drivers of equity prices, on the one hand, and 
the voluminous literature on the propagation of financial crises in general, on the other hand. This section focuses on 
some of the literature that provides an explanation for the origin, transmission, and impact of the two crisis periods 
that fit the South African experience. 
 
2.1 Drivers of Equity Prices 
 
The extensive literature on the general drivers of equity prices includes the Gordon (1962) model and the 
APT (Chen, Roll, & Ross, 1986), which provides frameworks to study the behaviour of macroeconomic variables on 
stock prices. Although empirical studies on the topic have been quite diverse, the approaches focus primarily on two 
sets of factors as determinants of equity prices: domestic/fundamental and global/financial (IMF, 1998, 2000). 
Several studies point to the strong influence of external factors, such as global financial conditions on emerging 
market equity prices (for example IMF, 2008; IMF, 2000; Shiller, 2000). 
 
In the South African context, the results from the research of Coetzee (2002), Moolman and Du Toit 
(2005), and Durodola (2006) indicate a relationship between JSE stock prices and, in particular, monetary variables, 
exchange rates and foreign stock indices, with limited impact of such variables as industrial production. Chinzara 
(2011) shows that macroeconomic uncertainty significantly influences stock market volatility on the JSE and, more 
specifically, that financial crises increase volatility in the stock market and in most macroeconomic variables. He 
also found that volatility in short-term interest rates and exchange rates has the largest impact on stock market 
volatility. 
 
More closely related to our own study is the literature on the importance of the volatility of foreign stock 
markets in explaining domestic South African stock market volatility. This is documented in Samouilhan (2006) and 
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Chinzara and Aziakpono (2009). Chinzara and Aziakpono (2009) found that volatility in major developed and 
emerging stock markets explain volatility in the South African stock market. However, own past volatility explains a 
higher proportion of the variation in JSE current volatility than aggregate volatility in the foreign stock markets. 
 
2.2 Propagation of Financial Crises 
 
Earlier crisis literature focused on the distinction between fundamental causes of crises (when the economy 
is in a state of distress) and crises of the self-fulfilling variety that occur even in countries with immaculate market 
fundamentals. The fundamentals approach can be found in Kaminsky (1999) and Krugman (1979), while examples 
of the self-fulfilling variety are present in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Obstfeld (1996). This distinction is 
also found in the literature on channels of crisis transmission. Our study focuses on the stock market channel, but in 
order to provide perspective, we place this channel in the context of crisis transmission channels in general. This 
literature distinguishes between two broad groups transmission channels: fundamental causes and crisis transmission 
through investor behaviour (Hernándes & Valdés, 2001, p. 4; Kumar & Persaud, 2001, p. 8; Rose & Spiegel, 2009). 
Other authors distinguish between real and financial linkages. A related distinction is between pure contagion, which 
cannot be explained by changes in fundamentals, and spillovers based on fundamental factors (Fratzscher, 2000, p. 
4; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001), where real linkages focus on the trade channel and a common shock. Financial 
linkages, on the other hand, include direct financial linkages and indirect financial linkages via investor behaviour. 
 
The explanation of crisis transmission via financial linkages has become more prominent in the aftermath 
of the East Asian crisis, partly due to the enormous increase in the size and interlinkages of global financial markets 
(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1998; De Gregorio, Edwards, & Valdes, 2000). There is some overlap between theories 
classified as fundamental causes and investors’ behaviour, and it has proven difficult to empirically disentangle 
transmission mechanisms according to the above classifications (Claessens & Forbes, 2004). For example, countries 
that are closely linked in trade also tend to have strong financial linkages (see Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2001). Some 
studies even find that some of the contagion previously identified as attributable to trade linkages may actually stem 
from financial linkages (see for example Fratzscher, 2000). 
 
2.2.1 Real Linkages 
 
Notwithstanding these difficulties in disentangling crisis transmission mechanisms, several such channels 
are well documented. Real linkages are usually associated with the trade channel and a common or global shock 
(which has also been called a “monsoonal effect”). The latter can refer to a major economic shift in industrial 
countries (such as changes in interest rates or currency values), a change in commodity prices, and/or a reduction in 
global growth (Masson, 1998). In this context, it can be argued that the drop in commodity prices in 1998 
contributed to the crisis in Chile, South Africa, and Australia. 
 
The trade channel is a second “real” channel of crisis transmission and includes an income effect and a 
price effect (or competitive devaluation). The price effect is transmitted through the expected loss of 
competitiveness arising from exchange rate depreciation in export competitor countries, while the income effect 
stems from expected output contractions of major trading partners due to the crisis (Caramazza et al., 2000, p. 44; 
Claessens, Kose, & Terrones, 2009). Earlier studies focusing on the East Asian crisis stress the importance of the 
foreign trade channel (see Eichengreen, Rose, & Wyplosz, 1996; Glick & Rose, 1999; Eichengreen & Rose, 1998). 
 
2.2.2 Financial Linkages 
 
Financial linkages can in turn, be classified into two broad categories: direct financial linkages and investor 
behaviour. Direct financial linkages featured prominently in the context of the first part of the 2007-09 crisis and 
especially the experience of developed markets in the United States of America (US) and Europe. This focus is on 
exposure to sub-prime-related assets, the prevalence of exotic financial instruments and the potential contagious role 
of the international interbank market (see for example Bruinshoofd et al., 2010; Gros & Micossi, 2008; Davis, 
2008). 
 
Another example of financial linkages refers to the “common creditor channel” focusing on mutual 
dependence on foreign creditors. This explanation featured prominently in the literature on the East Asian crisis 
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(Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2000; Caramazza, et al., 2000; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). The “common creditor” 
channel is likely to be irrelevant in the 2008 crisis with the downturn centered on the world’s largest debtor (Rose & 
Spiegel, 2009). 
 
Different classifications and descriptions of the role of investor behaviour in the international transmission 
of financial crises are found in the literature (for example, see Claessens & Forbes, 2004; Hernándes & Valdés, 
2001). The following broad categories are discussed: liquidity problems, informational asymmetries and investor 
reassessment (or the so-called wake-up call), and a general change in risk aversion/investor sentiment. The 
underlying theme of most of these theories is that although investor behaviour is often ex-ante individually rational, 
collectively it can lead to excessive co-movements in market prices that cannot be explained by real fundamentals. 
 
Calvo and Mendoza (1998) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002) and others have empirically explored the 
channel of informational asymmetries. The basic implication of models of this sort is that each individual market 
agent may rationally respond more to the actions of other agents than to his/her own private information. Incentive 
structures and financial market practices can also contribute to herd behaviour. Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes 
(2001) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001) emphasise the behaviour of emerging market funds in this 
regard. 
 
Liquidity-related crisis transmission occurs when losses in one market force economic agents either to 
liquidate leveraged positions or to rebalance their portfolios in response. Empirical studies that confirmed the 
relevance of this channel during the East Asian and Russian crisis includes Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 
(2001), Calvo and Mendoza (1998), and Kodres and Pritsker (2002), while Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) 
explore this channel in the context of the 2007/2008 crisis. Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2009) relate the 
“liquidity squeeze” resulting in a flight to liquidity” to a “retrenchment” or “repatriation” hypothesis. 
 
Exogenous shifts in investors’ risk appetite constitute a related crisis transmission channel. In terms of the 
East Asian crisis, the co-movement of perceived risky assets such as Brazilian bonds, the Thai baht, the South 
African rand, and US junk bonds, even though Brazil, Thailand, South Africa, and the US share few macroeconomic 
trends, was indicative of this channel (Kumar & Persaud, 2001, p. 6). A global increase in risk aversion is also often 
cited as the major channel of international financial crisis transmission during the 2007/2008 crisis. A “global de-
leveraging” process was evident in the substantial shift across asset classes out of equities and into (particularly US) 
government bonds during the height of the crisis. The nature of these two channels suggests that countries that are 
highly integrated into the international financial system may be particularly prone to contagion, independent of their 
underlying level of risk. 
 
A related argument is that a crisis in one country may constitute a “wake-up call” for investors to reassess 
fundamentals in other countries, thus possibly spreading the crisis across economies (Fratzscher, 2000; Goldstein, 
1998; Basu, 1998). In other words, the crisis in one country may alert investors to potential dangers in other 
countries with similar vulnerabilities. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) found evidence that supports the “wake-
up call” hypothesis in the context of the Russian crisis, while the empirical results of Didier, Love, and Peria (2010) 
suggest evidence of a wake-up call during the first part of the global financial crisis. 
 
2.2.3 Previous Empirical Results 
 
In the South African context, only a few published papers directly examined the impact of the East Asian 
and Russian crisis on the South African financial markets. Boshoff (2006) used firm-level stock return data to 
evaluate how financial crises were transmitted to South African financial markets during the East Asian, Russian, 
and Argentinean crises. He concluded that trade and financial linkages do not explain the impact of international 
crises on larger South African firms and therefore that international crises have been transmitted to this country as a 
result of investor herding behaviour, rather than weak South African macroeconomic fundamentals. Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) showed that during the 1997 Asian crisis, no emerging market, South Africa included, suffered 
contagion. The results of the research of Collins and Biekpe (2003) contradict the Forbes and Rigobon results. They 
found that, along with Egypt, South Africa is one of the most integrated countries in Africa with regard to its 
financial markets. Based on their degree of integration, Egypt and South Africa were the most affected by contagion 
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during the crisis. This study extends the empirical data by focusing on an in-depth country experience for South 
Africa. 
 
Several empirical studies investigated the transmission of the global financial crisis to emerging market 
countries through the stock market channel. None of these studies focus specifically on South Africa, although some 
studies based on firm-level data include South African firms. In general, these studies point to a difference in the 
transmission of the crisis during the two parts of the crisis. During the first part, investors seemed to differentiate 
between markets with different fundamentals, evident of the “wake-up” hypothesis. During the second part of the 
crisis, contagion seemed to dominate, and funds were withdrawn from liquid markets worldwide, irrespective of 
country-specific fundamentals. Didier, Love, and Peria (2010) found evidence of a wake-up in the first stage of the 
crisis, but not after the collapse of Lehman. This suggests that investors cared about fundamentals in the early stages 
of the crisis. In the second period, the strongest significance is obtained for stock market turnover, which suggests 
that in the worst period of the crisis investors withdrew from liquid markets. In particular, markets with high ratios 
of equity holdings by US investors, high levels of portfolio inflows, greater liquidity, and more developed stock 
markets were correlated more closely with the US market. Their findings further indicate that the main channel of 
transmission appears to have been financial, and they find no support for a real/trade channel of transmission. 
 
Using firm-level data, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl (2009) find that equity portfolios with a high degree 
of integration with the US market before the crisis were more affected than segregated ones, which suggests that 
macro country risk dwarfed micro, firm-level risk as a global transmission channel. Investors discriminated more 
across countries (and governments) rather than across firms during the crisis. Their results also suggest that financial 
integration with US markets and country risk played central roles in making the crisis global, and thereby give 
support to the hypotheses of retrenchment and repatriation of capital to US markets as well as to that of global de-
leveraging and risk exposure reduction as key factors explaining why the crisis spread globally. 
 
In contrast, Bekaert et al. (2011), using global firm-level stock price data, find evidence of a “wake-up call 
hypothesis” and that countries with poor domestic fundamentals experienced by far the largest equity market 
declines and contagion. They found statistically significant, although economically insignificant, evidence of 
systematic contagion from US markets, but strong evidence of domestic contagion: the co-movement of portfolios 
within a country increased systematically during the crisis. 
 
The differentiated impact of the US stock market on commodity-producing and non-commodity-producing 
countries is documented by Aloui, Aïssa, and Nguyen (2011). Their results show strong evidence of time-varying 
dependence between each of the BRIC markets and the US markets, but the dependency is stronger for commodity-
price-dependent markets (Brazil and Russia) than for finished-product, export-oriented markets (India and China). 
Thus, their results suggest that heterogeneous economic structures and especially different trade profiles could be a 
relevant explanatory factor of the cross-market interdependences. 
 
Moosa (2010) examined stock market contagion from the US to the markets of the Gulf countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) during 2007-08. The empirical results show that 
the collapse of these stock markets did not result purely from contagion from the US stock market and oil prices 
decline. Local factors, including increasing debt levels, overheated real estate markets, and drying up of liquidity 
were more influential in triggering the collapse. 
 
This study complements and extends the results of these studies by including a broader set of emerging 
stock markets and by focusing specifically on two crisis periods. We also provide an explicit comparison between 
these two periods, shedding light on how changes in domestic policy variables, the international financial 
architecture, and policies related specifically to the stock market can change the nature of spillovers over time. 
 
3. BACKGROUND: THE MANIFESTATION OF THE TWO CRISES 
 
Before focusing on the impact of the two crises on the JSE, it is necessary to compare and contrast the 
nature of the two crises in terms of their origins and similarities. Over-leveraging and bad debt were important 
common factors in fomenting both the crises. Weak banking systems, with inadequate supervisory oversight and 
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under-capitalised banks, were recognised by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) as key issues for the 
countries affected by the 1997-98 crisis. Unsustainable exchange rate arrangements, unsustainable budget deficits, 
asset price bubbles, and increasing credit growth also played major roles. The recent global financial crisis could be 
attributed to the solvency of the global banking system, widespread increases in asset prices and unusually low real 
interest rates (BIS, 2009). 
 
3.1 The East Asian and Russian Crisis of 1997-1998 
 
The start of East Asian part of the 1997-1998 crisis is generally considered to date to July 1997, when the 
pegging of the Thai baht to the US dollar was abandoned. This led to capital withdrawals and speculative attacks on 
Asian currencies, causing the exchange rate and financial asset prices in Thailand to decline sharply. Spillover 
effects were soon felt in other Asian countries, notably Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Economic 
fragility in the East Asian countries and political uncertainty that provoked instability in financial markets were at 
the heart of the crisis (Kaminsky & Schmukler, 1999). The turmoil in Asian financial markets and the recession in 
Japan contributed to a slowdown in global economic growth in the second half of 1997 and in 1998. 
 
The second part of the crisis erupted in August 1998, when the Russian government announced a 
depreciation of the rouble and a unilateral restructuring of external debt (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 2002). The surprise 
announcement on 2 September 1998 of the bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) compounded 
the international financial turmoil in a significant manner. This second part of the crisis led to widespread contagion 
and had a pronounced impact on stock markets worldwide, especially emerging markets, including South Africa. A 
general “flight to quality” meant that capital flows were redirected to the advanced economies. Following the 
announcement, the shares of German banks were exposed to economies around the world. Combined with falling 
commodity prices and consequent significant declines in the export earnings of commodity-producing countries, this 
aggravated the external financing difficulties of emerging-market economies. 
 
The crisis had a pronounced impact on several financial variables. The JSE all-share index fell by more 
than 36% in US$ terms during the worst part of the crisis (see Table 1 for more details). The major impact on the 
JSE became visible during the period May – September 1998. This was accompanied by record high interest rates 
and a depreciating currency. Heavy selling of South African fixed-interest securities by non-residents resulted in 
record high yields on long-term government bonds and bond spreads rose dramatically (South African Reserve 
Bank, 1998). In contrast to the dramatic impact on the financial sector, the impact on the real South African 
economy was muted. Declines in exports and production were relatively mild and short-lived (South African 
Reserve Bank, 1998). However the dramatic impact on interest rates did have an adverse impact on bank lending. 
 
3.2 The 2007-09 Crisis 
 
The first part of the crisis, the sub-prime crisis, occurred during the third quarter of 2007 when losses in the 
US sub-prime mortgage market unsettled global financial markets. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, announced 
on 15 September 2008, marked the start of the global spread of the financial crisis (Frankel & Saravelos, 2010). It is 
generally acknowledged that the global financial crisis was transmitted via international financial linkages, with the 
original shock in the US financial system leading to disruption in the financial systems of several advanced 
European countries. Exchange controls probably protected South Africa from the worst impact of the crisis as many 
toxic type instruments could not be traded or held.
1
 
 
In terms of the transmission to emerging stock markets, the IMF (2010) describes three phases of 
transmission of the crisis. First, some emerging markets, including South Africa, seemed to decouple from advanced 
economies between the start of the sub-prime crisis in August 2007 and the collapse of Lehman. Lehman’s collapse 
triggered panic in the global financial system, and stock markets around the world fell almost uniformly. On the 
JSE, the most dramatic fall occurred in October 2008, in line with international experience. The crisis also rapidly 
spilled over into the real economy of virtually all countries, with dramatic speed and apparent synchronicity. 
 
                                                          
1
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The impact on the South African real economy is evident from large declines in export values, GDP 
growth, and employment numbers during the worst part of the crisis, starting in the last quarter of 2008 (South 
African Reserve Bank, 2008). For example, GDP declined by 6.4% in the first quarter of 2009. Mining and 
manufacturing production and exports were hit particularly hard, with manufacturing losing 22.1% and 10.9% in the 
first and the second quarter of 2009, respectively. Declines in export values varied between 19% and 35% 
(compared to the same month in the previous year) every month from November 2008 to April 2009. 
 
3.3 The Impact of the Two Crisis Periods on Various Stock Markets 
 
The following two tables provide an indication of the impact of the two crisis periods on selected emerging 
and developed country stock markets. 
 
Table 1: Impact of the East Asian and Russian Crisis on Selected Stock Markets – Returns  
Calculated in US$ and Local Currency 
 
East Asian and Russian 
May 1998 - Oct 1998 
East Asian and Russian 
July 1997 - Oct 1998 
 US $ Local Currency US $ Local Currency 
Emerging Markets 
Brazil -42.24 -39.74 -53.12 -48.05 
China -32.78 -32.79 -60.48 -60.47 
Hungary -29.35 -26.90 -3.56 11.86 
India -32.99 -28.54 -42.32 -31.76 
Mexico -29.97 -16.97 -16.19 -2.12 
Poland -30.02 -11.12 -23.24 17.46 
Russia -81.72 -81.72 -85.31 -85.31 
South Africa -36.37 -29.32 -37.63 -22.74 
Thailand -15.66 -16.97 -39.10 -28.88 
Developed Markets 
Australia -8.62 -4.17 -18.06 -0.83 
Germany -2.29 -9.05 25.33 19.29 
UK -9.55 -10.02 16.04 14.90 
USA -1.27  24.36  
Source: Calculated from MSCI index values. Returns calculated as percentage change in index value at beginning of period compared to end of 
period. 
 
Even though markets that were most severely impacted by the East Asian crisis are not included in the 
sample, the devastating impact of this crisis on emerging stock markets is clear. Furthermore, most of these 
countries also experienced dramatic currency depreciation, with resulting large stock market losses, especially when 
measured in US$. During the first part of the East Asian crisis, the JSE suffered much lower losses than the majority 
of emerging markets in the sample. However, during the second part of the crisis, the JSE suffered large losses and 
the depreciation of the rand compounded these losses in dollar terms. These losses were still lower than those of 
most of the other emerging markets. Although the developed markets suffered losses during the height of the second 
part (Russian/LTCM) part of the crisis, these losses were recovered quickly. 
 
Table 2: Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Selected Stock Markets - Returns in US$ and Local Currency 
Selected Periods During the Global Financial Crisis 
 9/3/2007 – 9/1/2008 9/1/2008 – 12/31/2008 9/15/2008 – 3/13/2009 
 US$ Local Currency US$ Local Currency US$ Local Currency 
Emerging Markets 
Brazil -17.30 11.16 -51.56 -31.36 -35.74 -17.55 
China -23.15 -23.04 -28.31 -28.82 -22.55 -22.96 
Hungary -14.32 -25.32 -54.48 -46.66 -68.59 -56.99 
India -13.25 -6.25 -42.51 -36.61 -43.45 -36.78 
Mexico -13.04 -18.36 -38.17 -17.22 -42.25 -21.33 
Poland -19.27 -12.23 -46.41 -27.08 -58.84 -34.45 
Russia -10.92 -11.38 -63.18 -61.06 -49.63 -52.61 
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Table 2 cont. 
South Africa -12.91 -6.31 -26.86 -12.66 -30.81 -14.50 
Thailand -21.18 -24.54 -36.09 -33.63 -27.04 -21.49 
Developed Markets 
Australia -15.15 -18.07 -39.23 -26.01 -41.97 -28.54 
Germany -12.82 -18.66 -31.70 -28.31 -43.56 -37.88 
UK -21.59 -12.03 -36.85 -20.99 -44.05 -28.18 
USA -12.34  -30.03  -36.37  
Source: Calculated from MSCI index values 
 
The calculated returns in Table 2 point towards the decoupling of emerging markets during the first part of 
the crisis (2007-08) and recoupling during the second part of the crisis (2008-09). One possible reason, and one that 
can also be linked to the wake-up hypothesis, is the sharp decline in commodity prices during the second half of 
2008. Some commentators refer to this as a commodity bubble that peaked in mid-2008 and then subsequently 
collapsed (Caballero, Farhi, & Gourinchas, 2008). 
 
During both parts of the crisis, the JSE was less affected than most of the other emerging market countries 
in the sample, most notably the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Especially during the second (and 
worst) part of the crisis, JSE returns were towards the higher end of the spectrum (lower negative returns than most 
countries in the sample). In US$ terms, the US stock market was the only market in the sample that performed better 
than the JSE during this period. The general flight to quality during this sub-period is reflected in the relative over-
performance of developed markets. 
 
3.4 Comparing South African Economic Indicators during the Crisis Periods 
 
Taking into account the variables indicating the vulnerability of a country, Table 3 compares some of these 
indicators across the two crisis periods. Indicators of crisis vulnerability were stronger during the global financial 
crisis – particularly the foreign reserve position. At the onset of the East Asian crisis South Africa had just enough 
reserves to pay for 3.8 weeks’ of imports. This, together with the South African Reserve Bank’s policy of a managed 
floating exchange rate, left the local currency extremely vulnerable to speculative attacks. 
 
Table 3: Fundamental South African Economic Indicators during the Two Crisis Periods 
 
Budget 
Deficit as % 
of GDP 
Total Foreign 
Debt as % of 
GDP 
Current 
Account as % 
of GDP 
Net Direct 
Investment 
(Rmillion) 
Net Portfolio 
Investment 
(Rmillion) 
Imports 
Covered by 
Reserves 
(weeks) 
1997Q1 -6.2 26.4 -1.7 813 7317 3.8 
1997Q2 -7.6 26.4 -1.3 5104 11564 6.1 
1997Q3 -3.4 26.4 -1.2 -1325 13367 7.1 
1997Q4 -1.1 26.4 -1.7 2164 -1668 7.3 
1998Q1 -1.8 28.3 -0.5 -553 19359 8.2 
1998Q2 -7.6 28.3 -1.0 1079 11211 8.8 
1998Q3 -2.9 28.3 -2.7 -6350 -6529 7.4 
1998Q4 1.1 28.3 -2.8 -913 -3666 7.4 
              
2007Q1 1.0 26.3 -6.8 1695 24343 13.0 
2007Q2 -1.1 26.3 -6.2 -1757 35647 13.1 
2007Q3 0.0 26.3 -8.4 11885 19866 13.2 
2007Q4 2.8 26.3 -7.2 7401 -6397 13.0 
2008Q1 1.6 26.2 -8.5 39744 -22173 14.7 
2008Q2 -0.4 26.2 -7.0 3430 10907 13.5 
2008Q3 -1.9 26.2 -7.5 11176 -11924 13.1 
2008Q4 -1.5 26.2 -5.4 45941 -111675 17.2 
2009Q1 -0.1 27.7 -6.7 13642 9054 20.0 
2009Q2 -9.6 27.7 -3.5 21222 29259 20.5 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, various issues 
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Some of these variables, like foreign debt, are the same across the two periods and indicate a structural 
reliance on foreign capital that did not change over the decade. Within these long-term trends, there was also 
pronounced changes in the foreign debt position during specific crisis months. For example, the rand value of total 
external debt rose from R190.8 billion at the end of 1997 to R228.9 billion at the end of June 1998 partly due to the 
sharp depreciation of the rand against the dollar in the first half of 1998. Foreign debt as a percentage of gross 
domestic product increased only marginally from 30.4% at the end of 1997 to 30.9% at the end of June 1998. 
Almost the same is true about the current account deficit. South Africans are used to these outflows; however, it has 
shown a consistent increase as percentage of GDP over the two periods – a potential weakness and cause for 
concern. 
 
Another striking feature portrayed by Table 3 is the increase in both net direct investment and portfolio 
investment since 1997. These inflows have helped to balance the increasing outflows due to imports. The volatility 
and changing nature of portfolio flows in particular is a cause for concern and leaves the country exposed. 
 
In contrast to the fundamental weaknesses in the East Asian countries, South Africa had a fundamentally 
sound financial system, a flexible exchange rate system and more sustainable budget and balance of payments 
deficits (South African Reserve Bank, 1998). In both crisis periods, there was a marked change in the level and 
composition of capital flows compared to more tranquil times. An important remedial policy initiative in this regard 
was the elimination of the oversold net open position in foreign currency (NOFP) of the South African Reserve 
Bank (which stood at US$23.2 billion at the end of September 1998), which was achieved in May 2003. Successful 
price stabilisation policies in the form of inflation targeting were introduced. The Reserve Bank also adopted a 
policy of non-intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
 
The budget deficit has improved since the first crisis period. The unusual deficit during 2009 is a symptom 
of the first South African recession since August 1999. The fundamental economic indicators overall indicate more 
vulnerability during the East Asian and Russian crisis, and the main reason for this is the country’s foreign reserve 
position. 
 
In contrast, at the onset of the 2007-09 global crisis, the foreign reserve position of South Africa was much 
healthier. For both 2008 and 2009 as a whole, the country’s net international reserves showed a marked increase. 
International reserves advanced by US$5.6 billion from the end of 2008 to the end of 2009. In line with its exchange 
rate policy of non-intervention, the Bank did not use its reserves to influence the exchange rate of the rand and has 
not been required to use its reserves in any way to support the stability of the financial system. South Africa was one 
of a group of emerging market countries that managed the crisis without significant depletion of international 
reserves (Aizenman & Pinto, 2011, p. 19). 
 
In terms of public debt management, South Africa did not have the problems that plagued the East Asian 
countries, such as a high percentage of short-term foreign debt. Nevertheless, the public debt position improved 
during this time period. By 2008, South Africa was running a small budget surplus in 2008 and the debt/GDP ratio 
stood at 27%. This compares to a budget deficit of 6.2% at the start of 1997, while total foreign debt as percentage 
of GDP remained relatively stable during the period under investigation. 
 
The South African financial system did not share the same macroeconomic fundamentals as those that are 
widely described as the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Most notably, South African banks had no 
exposure to “sub-prime” assets, and very limited exposure to derivative instruments, asset-backed securities, and 
foreign assets. Several policy initiatives contributed to the development of the domestic banking market. For 
example, the National Credit Act (NCA) of 2007 contains provisions to protect consumers from reckless lending 
practices. Complementary regulatory initiatives in this regard include increased capital adequacy requirements and 
setting conservative leverage ratios and prudential regulatory limits to foreign exposure. The experience of the small 
banking crisis in 2002 and the implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord in 2008 have led to improved risk 
management practices and stronger crisis management arrangements. 
 
Several operational and regulatory changes to the operations of the JSE came into effect in 1995. These 
regulatory changes included a new JSE constitution and the adoption of improved trading systems. SETS, a London-
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based trading system that allowed automatic execution of trades, information efficiency, and reduced the incidence 
of insider trading, was introduced in 2002. Gradual liberalisation of exchange controls, which started in 1997, 
further broadened the investor base and resulted in higher turnover and liquidity on the JSE. For example, liquidity 
levels increased from 20% in 1998 to 62% in 2008 (South African Reserve Bank, various issues). 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC STUDY: SPILLOVER EFFECTS FROM GLOBAL MARKETS TO THE JSE 
 
This section of the paper empirically investigates which stock markets had the biggest impact on the JSE 
during the two crisis periods, particularly in terms of volatility transmission, and ascertains whether or not this 
impact changed between the two crisis periods. 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The stock price data used, measured in US dollars, was obtained from the database Thomson Reuters 
Datastream. Datastream compiles its own “total market” share price index per individual country. From the raw 
downloaded daily closing indices, weekly averages were calculated. Rates of return for all the indices were 
calculated as a percentage log difference. By using weekly data, the problem of missing daily data is partly 
addressed. 
 
Apart from South Africa, twelve countries are included in the empirical study. Developed markets are 
represented by the stock market indices of the USA, UK, Germany, and Australia. South Africa is currently 
classified as an “advanced emerging stock market” by the FTSE; therefore Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, and Taiwan are 
included to complete the group of “advanced emerging stock markets.” Countries from another emerging markets 
grouping are also included: Brazil, Russia, India, and China together with South Africa are part of the so-called 
“BRICS” countries. The last country to be included is Thailand. Thailand is also classified as an emerging market 
and is included because the devaluation of the Thai baht started the 1997-1998 East Asian crisis. 
 
Two eighteen-month periods were identified to represent the two crisis periods: July 1997 – December 
1998 and July 2008 – December 2009. The first period includes the start of the East Asian crisis, the aftermath of the 
East Asian crisis and the Russian crisis of August 1998 (Voronkova, 2004). The second period includes the 15 
September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse and the response of world markets to it. According to Frankel and 
Saravelos (2010) equity prices suggest that the global financial crisis began in earnest in September 2008 and ended 
in May 2009. Even though the crisis periods could be narrowed down further to only six months, the empirical 
technique requires a longer data set. 
 
4.2 Volatility Transmission (Bi-Variate GARCH) 
 
In financial markets, periods of uncertainty tend to increase the volatility of asset returns. During crisis 
periods volatilities also move together across financial assets and different countries. In this regard multivariate 
GARCH (MGARCH) models help to identify relations between volatilities and co-volatilities of different markets 
(Bollerslev, 1990). Among the MGARCH models specified as linear combinations of univariate GARCH models 
are: the diagonal VECH, diagonal BEKK, and constant conditional correlation (CCC) models. Diagonal VECH is 
the most unrestricted of the three, but it does not guarantee a positive semi-definite conditional covariance matrix. 
CCC is the most restricted of the three models and reduces the numbers of estimated parameters and simplifies the 
estimation process (Bauwens, Laurent, & Romouts, 2006). 
 
The limited number of observations for each crisis period does not allow the estimation of a MGARCH 
model including all 13 countries in this study. Therefore twelve separate bi-variate GARCH models, CCC 
specification, were estimated to model the transmission of stock market volatility between South Africa and each of 
the identified countries. (Diagonal VECH and BEKK specifications did not render positive semi-definite conditional 
covariance matrices.) 
 
In the two mean equations, each country’s weekly stock market return is estimated as a constant. In the 
covariance specification, three equations are specified: a GARCH(1,1) model for each of the two countries (see 
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Equations 1 and 2 below) and a covariance equation (see Equation 3 below) including the square root of the product 
of the two GARCH terms: 
 
GARCH1 = C(3) + C(4)*RESID1(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH1(-1) (1) 
 
GARCH2 = C(6) + C(7)*RESID2(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH2(-1) (2) 
 
COV1_2 = C(9)*@SQRT(GARCH1*GARCH2) (3) 
 
Table 4 summarises the covariance coefficients (c(9) in Equation 3) between South Africa and all 12 
countries across the two crisis periods. These covariance coefficients are interpreted as indicators of volatility 
transmission.
2
 
 
Table 4: Estimates of Volatility Covariance 
 East Asian/Russian Crisis Global Financial Crisis 
Country coefficient z-stat prob coefficient z-stat prob 
Australia 0.4972 4.26 0.000 0.8283 25.66 0.000 
Brazil 0.5642 6.47 0.000 0.8611 19.67 0.000 
China 0.1673 1.36 0.174 0.3567 2.67 0.008 
Germany 0.5545 6.23 0.000 0.8886 28.11 0.000 
Hungary 0.5472 6.19 0.000 0.8498 25.30 0.000 
India 0.2899 2.65 0.008 0.6755 8.75 0.000 
Mexico 0.6493 8.94 0.000 0.8073 16.42 0.000 
Russia 0.5466 4.88 0.000 0.7506 13.92 0.000 
Taiwan 0.4530 4.37 0.000 0.6394 7.36 0.000 
Thailand 0.5691 5.51 0.000 0.6854 12.47 0.000 
UK 0.5084 4.87 0.000 0.8524 23.57 0.000 
US 0.5540 6.45 0.000 0.8737 27.06 0.000 
Source: Authors’ own estimates using EViews. Each sample period includes 79 observations. Volatility of weekly returns modelled. 
 
Volatility transmission between South Africa and all 12 countries included were higher during the global 
financial crisis than during the East Asian and Russian crisis – as was expected. The 2008/2009 crisis truly was a 
global crisis. During both periods, volatility transfer from China was the lowest of all countries. The estimated 
coefficients for China – which are the only two estimated coefficients that are not statistically significant at a 1% 
level – are also the least significant of the 24 that were estimated. 
 
Table 5: Ranking of Volatility Spillover during Both Crisis Periods 
East Asian and Russian Crisis Global Financial Crisis 
Country Volatility coefficient Rank Country Volatility coefficient Rank 
Mexico 0.6493 1 Germany 0.8886 1 
Thailand 0.5691 2 US 0.8737 2 
Brazil 0.5642 3 Brazil 0.8611 3 
Germany 0.5545 4 UK 0.8524 4 
US 0.5540 5 Hungary 0.8498 5 
Hungary 0.5472 6 Australia 0.8283 6 
Russia 0.5466 7 Mexico 0.8073 7 
UK 0.5084 8 Russia 0.7506 8 
Australia 0.4972 9 Thailand 0.6854 9 
Taiwan 0.4530 10 India 0.6755 10 
India 0.2899 11 Taiwan 0.6394 11 
China 0.1673 12 China 0.3567 12 
 
                                                          
2 Differences in asset allocation decision of institutional investors could have an impact on the estimated spillover effects. In countries where 
institutional investors are biased towards equities, the volatility impact would be higher than in markets where portfolios are biased towards 
bonds. (The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this comment. However, comparing asset allocation across investors and 
across countries falls outside the scope of this paper.) 
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Table 5 ranks the countries in terms of volatility spillover during the two periods. During the East Asian 
and Russian crisis, the calculated volatility covariance between the South African stock market and the markets of 
Mexico, Thailand, Brazil, Germany, US, and Hungary were the highest. The impact of Mexico and Thailand can be 
explained by the East Asian origin of the crisis. Volatility co-movement with Hungary can be explained by the two 
countries’ status as advanced emerging markets. Hungary was one of the Eastern European countries hit hardest by 
the crisis and required a US$25.1 billion credit line from the International Monetary Fund, mainly to improve its 
public debt position. Hungary had one of the largest budget deficits in the EU. 
 
During the second crisis period, Germany, the US, Brazil, the UK, Hungary, and Australia played the 
dominant parts. Given that the crisis originated in the US, and given the consequent impact on the real economies of 
Europe, it is not surprising that the developing countries were the most dominant sources of volatility. Hungary, as 
an advanced emerging market, features again. The strong impact of Brazil and Australia (in the second crisis) can 
most likely be attributed to the fact that these stock markets, like South Africa, are dominated by resource 
(commodity-producing) companies. This provides supporting evidence to the hypothesis that commodity-producing 
countries were hit particularly hard during the second part of the global financial crisis. Volatility linkages with 
Germany, particularly in the second crisis period, can be explained by Germany’s role as South Africa’s main 
trading partner in Europe. Uncertainty or volatility on the German stock market is likely to enhance uncertainty on 
the South African market. Volatility co-movement between South Africa and China, and India and Russia 
respectively is not that high. Despite being part of the BRICS grouping, South Africa is more prone to share periods 
of high volatility with the developed markets of Germany, US, and UK and fellow advanced emerging markets of 
Brazil and Hungary. 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
From the previous section it is evident that both crisis periods considered had a serious impact on the South 
African stock market and broader economy, despite the fact that the macroeconomic fundamentals in South Africa 
differed from those in the countries at the centre of the crisis. However, the nature of the impact on the South 
African economy, and especially on the JSE, differed. 
 
Emerging stock markets were the hardest hit by the East Asian and Russian crisis. For the period July 1997 
to October 1998 the developed markets of Germany, UK, and US generated positive returns, while only Australia 
reported a negative return. All nine emerging markets included in the study reported large negative returns. 
Hungary, Mexico, and Poland outperformed the South African stock market, while Thailand and the BRIC countries 
were worse off than South Africa. Since May 1998, during the second part of the crisis, losses on the JSE were more 
severe – coupled with a strong depreciation of the currency. Overall the JSE was among the worst-performing 
emerging markets during this period. This crisis was predominantly an emerging markets crisis. 
 
Volatility spillovers from emerging markets to the JSE were more pronounced than those from developed 
markets. The South African macroeconomic fundamentals were weaker than a decade later – with higher budget 
deficits and much lower levels of international reserves. The low level of reserves was a crucial weakness amidst a 
managed floating exchange rate. The South African stock market (and consequently the exchange rate) was more at 
risk from speculators – and this was reflected in the realised returns. 
 
During the recent global crisis, both developed and emerging markets reported negative returns. However, 
some emerging markets outperformed the developed markets. For the period September 2007 to September 2008, 
the South African and Russian stock markets were generally better off than the developed markets. From September 
2008 until March 2009 China, Thailand, South Africa, and Brazil outperformed the developed markets included in 
this study. This was a truly global crisis, with both developed and emerging stock markets adversely affected. 
However, in contrast to the East Asian and Russian crisis, some emerging markets (including South Africa) were 
better off than the developed markets. This time the JSE was one of the best-performing emerging markets. 
 
Data on net portfolio investment indicates that South Africa decoupled from developed economies during 
the sub-prime crisis – with large positive net inflows into the country. The collapse of Lehman Brothers caused 
massive outflows in the fourth quarter of 2008. During this worst part of the crisis investors withdrew from liquid 
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markets like South Africa. These outflows changed into inflows during the first two quarters of 2009. In terms of 
fundamentals the South African economy was stronger than during the first crisis. The budget deficit was lower – 
and budget surpluses were even recorded. The level of foreign reserves was also much higher – without the burden 
of a managed floating exchange rate. During this crisis, the JSE experienced more pronounced volatility spillovers 
from developed markets: the US and UK as two of the most important financial markets, Germany as an important 
trading partner and other resource-based economies like Brazil and Australia. 
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